The limited liability company has been the vehicle for facilitating phenomenal levels of economic growth globally. In economic terms it reduces transaction costs, shifts risk to the most efficient risk-bearer, enables investor diversification and the growth of efficient stock markets. In moral terms, however, it has been criticised for infringing the principle of personal responsibility for debt, encouraging undue-risk taking, enabling shareholders to evade tort liabilities and facilitating the growth of excessively large and unaccountable businesses. Companies are prone to failure and scandal reflecting both entrepreneurial risks and human greed. Against this background there has been almost constant reform of company law in the UK since the mid-19th century. The regulatory environment both internationally and nationally is extremely complex and burdensome, both in terms of the quantity of institutions and the regulatory material itself. The costs of this are immense, for example, the Administrative Burdens Measurements Exercise (ABME) in 2006 estimated that the regulation of accounting and company law accounted for a massive £6,680 million, 51% of the total estimated administrative cost of business. My research is focused on how the economic success of the company can be retained whilst addressing problems of failure and scandal in a cost-effective fashion.